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Abstract. A new chaotic map based IP (Intellectual 
Property) watermarking scheme at physical design level is 
presented. An encrypted watermark is embedded into the 
physical layout of a circuit by configuring LUT (Lookup 
Table) as specific functions when it is placed and routed 
onto the FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array). The 
main contribution is the use of multiple chaotic maps in the 
processes of watermark design and embedding, which effi-
ciently improves the security of watermark. A hashed 
chaotic sequence is used to scramble the watermark. Sec-
ondly, two pseudo-random sequences are generated by 
using chaotic maps. One is used to determine unused LUT 
locations, and the other divides the watermark into groups. 
The watermark identifies original owner and is difficult to 
detect. This scheme was tested on a Xilinx Virtex 
XCV600-6bg432 FPGA. The experimental results show that 
our method has low impact on functionality, short path 
delay and high robustness in comparison with other 
methods. 
Keywords 
IP reuse technology, FPGA, chaotic map, LUT, IP 
watermarking. 
1. Introduction 
With the rapid development of deep sub-micron inte-
grated circuit systems, people expect that more logic func-
tions could be integrated into one piece of silicon. Gradu-
ally, Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) has emerged 
and become a mainstream technology in IC design. Mean-
while, in most of FPGA-based designs [1], [2], intellectual 
property (IP) reuse technology is widely used for shortening 
design cycle and reducing product risk. Therefore, the 
problem of effective IP protection has been concerned by 
more and more semiconductor companies. 
Recently, digital watermarking has evolved as a mature 
technology to protect the authorship of multimedia source 
of text, image and video [3-5]. Many researchers have 
attempted to solve IP protection problem existed in deep 
sub-micron IC systems [4-7, 11-27] on the basis of digital 
watermarking. IP watermarking has emerged as a novel 
technology for IP protection, which provides convincing 
evidence by hiding ownership information in designs. The 
reuse-based design flow is stated as follows. Firstly, the 
design specification and structure are determined according 
to the actual needs. The system level model should also be 
built. Then we describe and simulate the behavior of the 
design. The physical layout is generated after that. Finally, 
we generate the bitfile and download to the target device for 
verification [4], [5]. The outputs in various levels are 
collectively called IP modules, which can be used in other 
design. Reusable IP cores are classified into three 
categories: soft IP, firm IP and hard IP [6], [7], as shown in 
Fig. 1. 
IP watermark can be embedded at various levels in 
design flow, which are system level, behavioral level, 
structural and physical level from high to low. The water-
mark can only be detected at the embedded level or lower 
levels. The watermarked IP has low probability of coinci-
dence. Thus IP protection problem has been solved. 
Considering the criteria of multimedia watermarking [3] 
and features of IP cores, IP watermarking should have the 
following characteristics: 
 Robustness. Watermark can survive various regular 
manipulation or attacks and can be extracted correctly.  
 Reliability. After embedding watermark, IP core 
becomes a unique design with low probability of 
coincidence, thus provide convincing evidence to 
prove the identity of the IP circuit. 
 Transparency. Embedding watermark has no impact 
on design function and is not easily found. 
 Low overhead. The overhead of watermark embed-
ding and extraction is much lower than that of the 
original design. 
 Good traceability. Embedding watermark at a design 
level, watermark can be traced at lower levels even 
after IP has been packaged. 
 Low impact on performance. The performance in 
terms of area, power and speed should not be degraded 
obviously after embedding watermark. 
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Fig. 1.  Flow chart of IP design and watermark at different levels. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses previous approaches to IP watermarking. Section 
3 introduces relevant definitions about chaotic map, builds 
watermarking mathematic model and describes the proc-
esses of watermark embedding and extraction in details. 
Section 4 presents experimental results and analyzes the 
performance of the proposed method and the paper is sum-
marized in section 5. 
2. Related Work 
Chaotic map is a determinate and random process in 
nonlinear dynamical system, which is non-periodic, 
non-convergent and depending on initial value sensitively 
[8-10]. Chaos-based security technology is widely used in 
the fields of network security, secure communication and 
copyright protection. In the application of IP protection, 
chaotic sequences are generated randomly and sensitive to 
initial value, which is consistent with the security and ran-
domness of watermark in IP reuse. 
IP protection in reuse-based design is mainly 
post-processing based on FPGA [11-15]. Early in the 1990s, 
Lach et al. [16-18] first proposed the concept of FPGA-base 
watermarking and conducted lots of studies on this field. 
The methods in [16-18] encrypt the signature of IP owner, 
and embed it in unused LUT of FPGA. Inputs of these 
LUTs are taken from passing signals and outputs are routed 
to neighboring “don’t care” inputs, then they are incor-
porated into the design. Kahng et al. [19] proposed the con-
straint-based IP watermarking. The method encodes the 
signature into an optimization problem and generates 
a unique watermarked design by limiting the solutions 
space to a certain area. Castillo et al. [20], [21] presented 
a method for embedding watermark at hardware description 
language (HDL) level. The watermark is inserted into un-
used LUTs or between used LUTs in FPGA-based design. 
The hardware overhead is primarily caused by watermark 
extraction circuit. Once the watermark extraction circuit 
detects a specific input sequence, the watermark will 
orderly be output from the store address. In the constraints 
based watermarking scheme proposed by Qu et al. [23], the 
watermark is divided into two parts: public and private. The 
public watermark can be detected in public and the third 
party is responsible for IP identification, while private 
watermark can only be detected by several authorized users 
to solve the difficulties in IP detection and authorization. 
A. K. Jain et al. [24] presented a zero overhead FPGA 
watermarking method by modifying time constraints of the 
nets for watermark embedding. Furthermore, Fingerprinting 
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techniques for FPGA IP protection have been proposed in 
[16], [25], this approach obtains fingerprints of different 
users, then embeds this fingerprint information in IP circuit. 
These approaches are of great use for IP protection and 
infringement tracking. However, the power overhead and 
path delay are accordingly increased. 
Most constraint-based watermarking scheme have 
been proposed at physical design level [11-19], [23-26], 
while less at structural level and behavioral level [5], 
[20-22]. By using these methods, it is hard for unauthorized 
users to detect, remove or modify the watermark. Therefore, 
the security of watermark will be improved. However, the 
performance in terms of power, area and circuit delay may 
be partly affected. 
A chaotic map based IP watermarking scheme is pro-
posed by considering less interference with normal func-
tion, minimum path delay and high security. In the scheme, 
we design a special structure for inserting watermark into 
LUT. The structure determines the locations of unused 
LUTs for watermark insertion. The watermark bits are 
controlled by the generated random sequences. The experi-
mental results show that the proposed scheme has low 
impact on performance and the amount of embedded water-
mark has been greatly increased. Therefore, convincing 
evidence has been provided to prove the identity of original 
ownership. 
3. Chaotic Watermark Algorithm 
3.1 Chaotic Model 
Chaotic map is introduced to improve the security of 
IP watermark. This section first gives relevant definitions 
and then introduces a new watermarking mathematic 
model. 
Definition 1: Chaotic behavior of Logistic map can be 
represented by one-dimensional non-linear function [19], 
[20], that is: 
 1 (1 )n n nx x x   , (0,4), (0,1), 0,1,nx n      (1) 
In (1), Logistic map is in chaos when 
λ  (3.5699456, 4).  That is,  given initial value X0,  the  
sequence {xii = 0, 1, …, N}, generated by Logistic map is 
non-periodic, non-convergent and depending on initial 
value sensitively, called chaotic sequence. Transform the 
real chaotic sequence generated by (1) into {0,1} binary 
chaotic sequence, and then take m bits of the binary chaotic 
sequence orderly to form a decimal chaotic sequence 
{di 0 < di <2m, i = 0, 1, 2,…}, represented by C. 
Definition 2: To avoid collision in chaotic scrambling, 
we hash sequence C using static hash table, and hash cha-
otic sequence F is generated. 
Select two initial values X0, X1 and X2, and use defini-
tion 1 and 2 for the generation of hash chaotic sequence Fl, 
Fc and Fs: 
 1 2{ , , }l NF l l l  , (2) 
 1 2{ }, , ,c NF c c c  , (3) 
 1 2{ }, , ,s NF s s s  . (4) 
3.2 Principle of LUT Watermark Embedding 
FPGA architecture mainly consists of configurable 
Logic Block (CLB), input/output block (IOB) and block 
RAM. As a basic assumption, all of the discussion and ex-
perimental work are in the context of the Xilinx XCV600 
architecture, where CLBs each contains two flip flops (FF) 
and two 16 1 lookup tables (LUT). 
Most of FPGA-based designs will contain large num-
ber of unused LUTs. Each n-input LUT could be regarded 
as a 2n  1 RAM and one bit in unused LUT can be used to 
encode one bit watermark. In this case, a 4-input LUT can 
encode 16 bits watermark at most. Arbitrary combinational 
logic with n variables could be implemented in n-input LUT. 
Considering that, we propose to embed watermark by con-
figuring unused LUTs in FPGA design. The development 
platform Xilinx ISE 9.1i is used in the proposed method. 
The signature is encoded into specific combinational logics 
by using code rules. The combinational logics are then 
implemented in selected unused LUTs, with the outputs as 
the watermark. Here, we use chaotic map for better security 
of watermark.  
Fig. 2 shows an example of configuring a specific 
function  for  indicating  watermark.  The  signature  
 
Fig. 2.  Example of implementing a F= (A1 and A2) or (A3 xor A4) function for watermark indication. 
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“hnulw…” is encoded into ASCII code and then scrambled 
as watermark “011…1”. The scrambled watermark is di-
vided into a number of watermark fragments by using 
chaotic sequence Fc. With the sequence Fl, the locations for 
embedding watermark are determined. By using FPGA 
editor tool, the fragments are inserted into the unused LUTs 
by configuring the unused LUTs at these locations. With the 
watermark fragment, the function F = (A1 and A2) or (A3 
xor A4) could be implemented by configuring the unused 
LUT. Finally, the watermarked LUTs will be incorporated 
into the design with some “don’t care” interconnects. It is 
hard for the attackers to detect the locations of watermarked 
LUTs. Thus the security and reliability of watermark are 
greatly improved. 
3.3 Embedding and Extraction of Chaotic 
Map IP Watermark 
Two sequences are generated respectively for deter-
mining the locations of unused LUTs and controlling the 
embedded watermark bits. Since chaotic map depends on 
initial value and is sensitive to parameters, we propose to 
embed watermark in unused LUT randomly. As a result, the 
strength of watermark is enhanced. 
3.3.1 Watermark Embedding 
The flow chart of watermark embedding is shown in 
Fig. 3. Supposing the ownership information is “hnulw…”, 
 
Fig. 3.  Flow chart of watermark embedding. 
 
the embedding process is stated as follows: 
Input: Original ownership information W, the carrier 
(IP core) 
Output: watermarked carrier 
Step 1: The ownership information W is encoded into 
ASCII code, indicating the watermark. Then we generate 
a hash chaotic sequence Fs, denoted by s1, s2,…,sN,(key1 as 
the key) for scrambling the watermark. Finally the scram-
bled watermark is generated for embedding; 
Step 2: Add a set of additional constraints to make the 
locations of watermarked LUT close to used LUTs. The 
constraints are programmed in user constraints file of ISE 
tool. In this case, overlong nets between LUTs will not 
emerge in the watermarked design. Meanwhile, the resource 
occupation and path delay will not increase obviously; 
Step 3: Given two initial values (key2 as the key), two 
hash chaotic sequences Fl and Fc are generated for deter-
mining locations of unused LUTs pi (1 < i < N) and con-
trolling embedded watermark bits gi (1 < i < N); 
Step 4: The scrambled watermark sequence is divided 
into groups g = {g1, g2,…,gN}by using chaotic sequence Fc; 
Step 5: According to the locations for embedding 
watermark p = {p1, p2,…,pN} and embedded watermark bits 
g = {g1, g2,…,gN}, we build the logic functions 
f = f1, f2,…,fN, with the outputs indicating watermark; 
Step 6: Since an arbitrary combinational logic with 4 
variables could be implemented in a 4-input LUT, we 
implement various functions f in multiple unused LUTs for 
embedding watermark fragments. After all the functions are 
configured, the watermarked IP is generated.  
3.3.2 Watermark Extraction 
When the IP core is suspicious to be misappropriation, 
the author could apply to the third party for the verification 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Flow chart of watermark extraction.
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of watermark. The IP owner provides the reversed se-
quences and signature that they used in watermark embed-
ding. With the signature and the sequences, the unbiased 
validation team reverses the watermark preparation and 
embedding process: identify the LUTs used for embedding 
watermark using the sequence Fl, extract the logic outputs 
at these locations, combine and decrypt the message to print 
out the resulting signature. If the signature matches that 
provided by the IP owner, then ownership has been estab-
lished. The flow chart of watermark extraction is shown in 
Fig. 4; the detailed steps are as follows: 
Input: Initial chaotic keys: key1, key2 and the carrier 
(IP core) 
Output: The original ownership information W 
Step 1: Establish mapping relations between water-
marked carrier and elements of scrambled watermark se-
quence {Si, 1  i  N}; 
Step 2: Obtain chaotic sequences Fl and Fc with key2 
and extract the logic function f = f1, f2,…,fN, implemented in 
LUT; 
Step 3: Restore the function in step2 and obtain the 
watermark groups embedded in LUT g = {g1, g2,…,gN}; 
Step 4: Extract watermark groups embedded in the 
locations p = {p1, p2,…,pN} and recombine the groups as 
ASCII code of original watermark W; 
Step 5: Decode the ASCII code of watermark and get 
the original ownership information W. 
4. Experiments and Performance 
Analysis 
4.1 Experiments 
We verified the method in the context of Xilinx Virtex 
XCV600-6bg432, with operating frequency 75.3 MHz and 
IP cores: DES56 [27], MD5 [28], RSA [29]. This section 
gives the physical layouts of IP core before and after 
embedding watermark. 
Take DES core for example, first of all, we perform 
compiling, synthesis, place and route on DES core; in the 
end we obtain the original layout of DES in Fig. 5 (a). Using 
our method respectively embeds watermark of 32 bits, 256 
bits and 512 bits, the watermarked layouts are presented in 
Fig. 5(b), Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d). As seen in Fig. 5(a-d): the 
physical layout in Fig. 5(b) with 32 bits watermark has 
denser nets and larger area than the original layout in 
Fig. 5(a), the area of the results in Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d) 
increase to some extent. It can be concluded that the overall 
physical layout of IP core will be changed by using our 
method for embedding watermark, but without interfering 
with robustness and security of the circuit, and stable 
performance of the circuit can be achieved at the cost of 
area. 
In addition, we compare our method with methods in 
[6] and [11]. The experimental results are presented in 
Table 1. The occupied  resource and delay time are respec- 
         
(a)Original layout                                 (b) Layout with 32bits watermark 
         
(c)Layout with 256bits watermark                    (d) Layout with 512bits watermark 
Fig. 5.  Physical layout of DES (original, 32bits watermark, 256bits watermark and 512bits watermark). 
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32bit W.M 256bit W.M 512bit W.M 
Core Watermarking Method 
%resources %time %resources %time %resources %time 
Literature[6] 0.325 0.162 1.836 -0.171 3.461 -2.312 
Literature [11] 0.413 -0.087 1.761 -0.129 3.823 -3.165 DES 
Ours 0.487 -0.102 1.939 -0.273 4.079 -3.986 
Literature [6] 0.478 0.092 2.655 0.231 4.572 2.341 
Literature [11] 0.568 0.077 2.732 -0.635 5.231 -3.562 RSA 
Ours 0.575 0.089 2.744 -0.804 5.776 -3.707 
Literature [6] 0.279 0.166 1.685 1.021 3.127 -0.011 
Literature [11] 0.354 -0.146 1.852 -1.219 3.408 -1.188 MD5 
Ours 0.373 -0.255 2.074 -1.276 3.842 -2.170 
Tab. 1.  Performance comparison with different methods based on DES, RSA, MD5. 
 
tively shown after embedding 32bit, 256bit and 512bit 
watermark. We conclude that the occupied resource will be 
a bit higher than other methods, while the delay time will 
decrease with the increase of embedded watermark. 
4.2 Resistance to Attacks 
Resistance to attacks is the ability of watermark being 
extracted correctly after various unauthorized attacks. For 
general FPGA-based IP watermarking, it is hard for attack-
ers to extract original watermark. However, the attackers 
may obtain the key of watermarked locations by power 
attack and destroy the watermark. Power Attack [30], [31] 
is actually an effective key attack, which could guess the 
key by analyzing the power of cipher module. Multi-thread 
power analog technology [32] is used to quantify the resis-
tance of cipher component to power attack in IP design and 
implementation. 
Therefore, multi-thread power analog technology is 
adopted to quantify the resistance to Power Attack of the 
watermarked components, meanwhile, some “don’t care” 
nets are connected with the watermarked LUTs, thus the 
function and performance will not be interfered, and the 
ability of resistance to Power Attack can be improved. 
4.3 Detection 
By using the approach in this paper, with the chaotic 
key key2 we can get two chaotic sequences Fl and Fc, from 
which we know the embedding locations and watermark 
bits in unused LUTs of FPGA, then with key 1 for restoring 
the original watermark, and finally prove the identification 
of the ownership. 
4.4 Circuit Area and Power Consumption 
Circuit area and power consumption of IP core mainly 
refers to the extra area and power overhead in the process of 
watermark embedding. Fig. 6 shows the trend of area and 
power of three testing cores with the increase of watermark. 
Fig. 6(a) shows an ascendant trend of power consumption 
with the increase of embedded watermark, but a downtrend 
of the increase rate. It is caused by that occupation of CLB  
 
(a) Power overhead 
 
(b) Circuit area 
Fig. 6.  Growth curves of power overhead and circuit area with 
the increase of embedded watermark. 
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increases rapidly in the embedding prophase, while the 
embedding of anaphase is on the basis of CLB occupied in 
prophase. Therefore, the nets within CLB grow with the 
increase of embedded watermark, while nets outside CLB 
may decrease, this may affect the rate of power consump-
tion to a certain extent. As shown in Fig. 6(b), with the 
increasing amount of embedded watermark, the circuit area 
overhead continuously grows overall, but the circuit area 
grows rapidly in the embedding of 256bits watermark, after 
that, the increasing watermark causes a flat trend of the area 
growth. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, a chaotic map-based IP watermarking at 
physical level is presented for IP protection in reuse tech-
nology. This approach uses multiple chaotic sequences in 
watermark embedding, thus improves security of IP water-
mark and verifies the circuit functions before and after 
watermarking using Modelsim6.2SE. The performance was 
verified in the context of Virtex XCV600-6bg432. The 
experimental results show that our approach has low impact 
on the normal function. Though the circuit area increases 
after embedding watermark, the performance in terms of 
path delay, robustness and security are guaranteed. Future 
work may focus on IP watermarking method at various 
levels, which includes optimization of watermarking 
method at high levels, adding testing circuit and implemen-
tation of equivalent circuit with resistance to attack. 
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